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Abstract
Simple exchange experiments have identiﬁed the fact that participants trade their
endowment less frequently than standard demand theory predicts. List (2003) ﬁnds,
however, that the most experienced dealers acting on a well functioning market are
not subject to this “endowment eﬀect”. Thus, it seems that a lot of market experi-
ence is needed to overcome the “endowment eﬀect”. In order to understand the eﬀect
of market experience, we introduce a distinction between two types of uncertainty,
choice uncertainty and trade uncertainty, which could both lead to an “endowment
eﬀect”. While List’s own explanation is related to choice uncertainty, we conjecture
that trade uncertainty is important for the “endowment eﬀect”. To test this con-
jecture, we design a simple experiment where the two treatments impact diﬀerently
on trade uncertainty, while controlling for choice uncertainty. Supporting our con-
jecture, we ﬁnd that “forcing” subjects to give away their endowment in a series of
exchanges, eliminates the “endowment eﬀect” in a subsequent test. We discuss why
markets might not succeed in providing suﬃcient incentives for learning to overcome
the “endowment eﬀect”.
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11 Introduction
Simple exchange experiments, starting with Knetsch (1989) have identiﬁed that participants
trade their endowment less frequently than standard demand theory predicts. This could
suggest that individuals value objects diﬀerently when they are in their possession than
when they are not. Further experiments and replication have conﬁrmed the robustness
of this phenomenon. Taken at face value, this “endowment eﬀect”1 implies that subjects
are likely to miss beneﬁcial trades. To evaluate the impact of such anomalies on actual
markets, it is natural to wonder whether the “endowment eﬀect” disappears with market
experience. List (2003) ran an experiment where subjects were dealers acting on a well
functioning market. He shows that the most experienced dealers are indeed not subject to
the “endowment eﬀect”. List’s experiment has played a prominent part in the debate to
address the robustness of results from the laboratory in the ﬁeld.
This raises the question of what it is the market does that makes people rational. The
answer is generally twofold: the market selects rational individuals – the market acts as
a ﬁlter for irrational behavior – and provides incentives to correct possible mistakes –
the market acts as a teacher (see List and Millimet (2008) and the numerous references
therein). The functioning of the selection on markets is rather easy to understand. Those
who make too many mistakes perform poorly on the market and either choose to withdraw
1We agree with Plott and Zeiler (2007) that the term “endowment eﬀect” is problematic because this
already entails an interpretation for the observed phenomenon, namely that too little trade in simple
exchange experiments is driven by the fact that players are endowed with one of the goods and experience
loss aversion with respect to their endowment. They refer to “endowment eﬀect theory” as the theory that
attributes this phenomenon to an endowment eﬀect. The results of Plott and Zeiler (2007) suggest that the
interpretation of endowment eﬀect theory is not warranted. Plott and Zeiler (2007) hence refer to “exchange
asymmetry” instead of “endowment eﬀect” for the phenomenon of too little trade in exchange experiments.
To keep a clear link to the literature, but to signal at the same time that the term is problematic, we call
the phenomenon the “endowment eﬀect”, keeping it in quotation marks throughout.
2or go bankrupt. But little is known about how market experience succeeds in teaching
participants to avoid anomalies, such as the “endowment eﬀect”. Note that if the underlying
mechanism was known we should be able to implement it in the lab so that subjects would
learn to overcome the “endowment eﬀect” using mechanisms similar to those they encounter
on the market. We make the following four observations that need to be taken into account
to understand this learning process.
First, in List’s experiments, only traders with intense market experience do overcome
the “endowment eﬀect”. Speciﬁcally, the experienced traders for whom no signiﬁcant “en-
dowment eﬀect” is detected are those with six or more trades a month in List (2003), and
typically they have had this experience over several years. Thus, learning is at best very
slow. Alternatively, it could be that no learning occurs at all, but just selection (those who
are not subject to the “endowment eﬀect” simply trade more both on the market and in
the lab). Given the slow speed at which participants overcome the “endowment eﬀect” (if
they learn at all), we wonder whether the market is a rather poor teacher in this subject2 or
whether what has to be learned to overcome the “endowment eﬀect” is just very diﬃcult.
Second, the experiments used to test for the existence of an “endowment eﬀect” are
very simple and do not necessitate any computational skills, nor inference about others’
behavior as in auctions. Subjects are just asked whether they want to exchange an object
they hold for another one. It it thus rather surprising that a lot of experience is required
to perform such a simple task adequately.
Third, while List (2003) uses unique sports collectors’ items, List (2004) replicates a
classical experiment in which the choices to be made involve mugs and chocolate bars,
2We stress that learning in the marketplace regarding other issues might be substantially faster, for
example, market participants might quickly learn how prices are formed on markets. Our focus here is on
the apparent lack of trading.
3again using participants who have experience on a sports-card market. As in List (2003)
only the participants with intensive market experience in the sports-card market, here
even eleven or more trades a month, show less of an “endowment eﬀect” in the simple
choice experiment with mugs and chocolate bars. That substantial experience is required
to eliminate an “endowment eﬀect” for such common items is even more surprising than
the intense experience required in List (2003).
Finally, List (2003) also reports experiments where subjects take part in four trading
sessions, each separated by a week. He notes a decline, though not elimination, of the
“endowment eﬀect”, concluding that these results “reinforce the notion that useful cognitive
capital builds up slowly, over days or years, rather than in the short run of an experiment.”
(p. 67), as noted previously by Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
Taken together, these four observations imply that the market does not eliminate the
“endowment eﬀect” easily and that learning is slow. To understand why, we take a step back
and consider what can be learned in the marketplace. List suggests that his results “may
indicate that experienced subjects are more certain of their preferences (or the goods’ val-
ues) and therefore trade more often than lesser-experienced agents.” (List, 2004, p. 617).3
According to this interpretation, what is learned in the marketplace is a better ability to
rank goods according to their relative value. Market experience may thus reduce preference
uncertainty. This is a plausible explanation for the results in List (2003), although it is still
surprising that such a large number of trades is required to learn this skill. Moreover, as
noted above, in List (2004) participants with higher market experience in the sports-card
market show less of an “endowment eﬀect” in the simple choice experiment with mugs
3This argument is essentially an application of Plott’s (1996) “discovered preference hypothesis”. It is
interesting to note that List’s argument, which refers to experience the subjects have gained in the ﬁeld, is
captured by Plott’s hypothesis, which was developed to explain results in the laboratory.
4and chocolate bars. But it is hard to see why intense experience dealing with sports-cards
should help develop expertise in ranking common items such as mugs and chocolate bars.
Therefore, the results in List (2004) are diﬃcult to explain only with the idea that experi-
enced dealers are more certain about their preferences. We thus conjecture that in addition
to uncertainty about preferences and the relative values of goods, market participants face
a diﬀerent type of uncertainty, which can be only slowly overcome with market experience,
if at all.4
We stress that in typical exchange experiments, the objects are carefully chosen to have
about equal market value. It is then reasonable to assume that the utility diﬀerence is rather
small for most subjects. In other words, a typical trade experiment is about choosing on
the edge, i.e. in the neighborhood of the indiﬀerence curve. Any small amount of uncer-
tainty might thus aﬀect subjects’ behavior, even if it seems negligible in other experiments.
Consequently, there are a myriad theories that could account for the “endowment eﬀect”.
Each of these then suggests a potential mechanism that could eliminate the “endowment
eﬀect”. Rather than going through a very long list, we argue that the various sources of
uncertainty that subjects might perceive when they face a trade opportunity fall into one
of the following two distinct categories: choice uncertainty or trade uncertainty.
Choice uncertainty includes all the potential sources of uncertainty that matter when
an individual has to choose between two or more objects. The relative value of the objects
at stake could be uncertain, individuals might have incomplete or fuzzy preferences, etc.
Choice uncertainty thus subsumes what we might want to call object or product uncertainty
as well as preference uncertainty.
4A natural question is to wonder how individuals can lack market experience since most of us are active
on the market on a daily basis. This is true as long as buying is considered. However, most individuals,
including usual lab subjects, have almost no experience as sellers. As pointed out already, e.g., by Kahneman
et al. (1990), the pathologies are most likely to occur on the selling side of the market.
5The other type of uncertainty concerns the market procedures. Individuals sometimes
overestimate the costs or the risks associated with market transactions. Thus, they might
be reluctant to trade if the beneﬁts are too small, judging that the beneﬁts will not cover the
transaction costs or the risk premium. This is what we call trade uncertainty. In general,
trade uncertainty concerns any uncertainty that might aﬀect the trading procedure itself.
At the most basic level, trading, in contrast to choosing, involves a (human) partner. This
implies that issues like fairness, altruism or other-regarding preferences might matter. For
example, as Plott and Zeiler (2007) argue, typical designs in exchange experiments entail
a potential risk of oﬀending the experimenter by rejecting an initial endowment perceived
as a gift. Anything that could be interpreted as an (uncertain) transaction cost falls into
the category of trade uncertainty. Alternatively, and somewhat more generally, one could
refer to process uncertainty instead of trade uncertainty. For the present context, however,
trade uncertainty captures the aspects we focus on.
This distinction helps us in making sense of the four observations listed above. If
subjects perceive trade uncertainty, then in order to realize that trading is not as risky as
they might believe, they need to experience trade precisely in those situations where they
are reluctant to trade. If they are free to choose when to trade, however, they will only very
rarely make such trades, for example only if the good to be obtained promises a substantial
gain. Put diﬀerently, in order to overcome a reluctance to trade, market participants need
to learn new trading strategies, namely to trade also when the perceived trade uncertainty
is high. But this is diﬃcult to learn because these are the trades they avoid. The market
would thus be a poor teacher because traders will avoid those trades that would teach them
the crucial lessons. Hence, if trade uncertainty is largely responsible for the “endowment
eﬀect”, this is consistent with learning to overcome it being slow, if it occurs at all. On the
6other hand, if people learn new trading strategies, they can also apply these to diﬀerent
types of good, so that the spill-over eﬀects observed in List (2004) are plausible.
The next step of our reasoning consists of ﬁnding a way to test our hypothesis that
trade uncertainty is a major factor underlying the “endowment eﬀect”. This boils down to
ﬁnding an experimental design that (1) controls for choice uncertainty and (2) impacts on
trade uncertainty, i.e. provides incentives to consider new trading strategies.
To do so, we create an experimental design composed of two distinct stages. The ﬁrst
stage, called the market stage, consists of a simple (experimental) market in which subjects
are free to trade with each other, interact, bargain, move, and so on. Subjects can thus gain
market experience in a setting that resembles a real market. After this training stage, we
test for the existence of an “endowment eﬀect” in the second stage of the experiment. This
second stage is performed in isolation and subjects can only trade with the experimenter.
The second stage is identical in all treatments.
The only diﬀerence between our two treatments is that in one treatment subjects are
free to trade at the market stage, while in the other treatment they are forced to trade, i.e.
if they do not exchange their initial endowment, they lose their object. This “forced” trade
encourages participants to trade even in situations where they perceive trade uncertainty
to be high and hence would normally avoid trade. As a result, relatively little experience
can be suﬃcient to learn new trading strategies. In that sense, our forced-trade treatment
serves as a “shock therapy” against the “endowment eﬀect”. The eﬀects of such learning
should also spill over to markets for diﬀerent goods (as is the case in our experiment) as
long as these are organized in a similar way so that the possible causes for trade uncertainty
are similar.
We ﬁnd that when forced to overcome their reluctance to trade during the market stage,
subjects are no longer prone to the “endowment eﬀect” afterwards. In contrast, if trade in
7the market stage is voluntary, we detect a clear “endowment eﬀect” in the second stage.
The key result is that in the forced-trade treatment subjects learned something that they
would not have learned if they had been free to trade. And as a consequence of what they
learned, subjects overcame the “endowment eﬀect”. By not providing suﬃciently strong
trading incentives, in a market where they were free to trade subjects did not consider the
trades that would have provided the crucial lessons.
That the endowment eﬀect can be eliminated in the lab is not a new result, as shown
by Plott and Zeiler (2007). These authors vary the endowment procedure and the way
subjects trade with the experimenter. Our approach is to use a trading mechanism that
sheds light on the way market experience can eliminate the “endowment eﬀect”, rather
than experimental procedures that are not related to market experience.
Having in mind that the diﬀerence between the forced-trade and free-trade treatments
is about trade uncertainty, we can safely assert that the “endowment eﬀect” is driven to
a large part by trade uncertainty and possibly more than by choice uncertainty. Further-
more, our experiments show that learning the crucial lessons is not necessarily diﬃcult if
the proper learning incentives are provided. Learning on the market might thus be slow
because it provides only limited incentives to learn new trading strategies to overcome
trade uncertainty. This then makes sense of the observation that market experience re-
moves under-trading only if it is very intense.5 Hence a free market is indeed a rather poor
teacher.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain our experimental
design and procedures in detail. This is followed by the results in Section 3, a discussion
of possible explanations and links to related literature in Section 4 and concluding remarks
in Section 5.
5For the same reason, repetition in trading experiments in the lab typically does not succeed in elimi-
nating the “endowment eﬀect”.
82 Experimental Design and Procedures
Our experiment was designed to test for the impact of trade uncertainty, and hence is
designed to keep the impact of choice uncertainty and the opportunities to reduce it through
learning constant across treatments.6 In contrast, the treatments diﬀer in the incentives to
learn new trading strategies that can overcome trade uncertainty.
The experiments were run in April 2007 at the University of Antille-Guyane in Mar-
tinique. Participants were primarily students of economics at undergraduate and master’s
level. The total number of participants was 74. The laboratory consisted of a circle of small
tables. On entering the room, participants drew cards assigning them to one of the tables.
The experiment consisted of two parts. The ﬁrst part consisted of three interactive
trading rounds that gave subjects the opportunity to gain trade experience. The second
part was performed in isolation and is a standard test of the “endowment eﬀect”.
In each trading round, the participants were randomly endowed with one of two diﬀerent
goods. After being given the opportunity to freely inspect the goods, they were assigned
one of the goods by drawing a card that was then exchanged for the respective good. All
the goods had non-trivial value for the participants: a package of coﬀee and a package of
rice (round 1), a package of crisps and a can of cola (round 2) and a notepad and a ball-pen
(round 3).
We conducted four sessions, two with “free trade” and two with “forced trade” in
the ﬁrst part. In the free-trade sessions, participants were free to trade with any of the
participants endowed with the other good. Interaction, movement and communication was
not restricted in any way. Participants could keep the good they possessed at the end of
6We also limit the possible impact of choice uncertainty, by reducing what is suggested by the results of
Plott and Zeiler (2007) to resolve choice uncertainty in a biased way by sending misleading signals about
the value of the objects. For example, there is no opportunity of herding.
9each round, whether it was the one they were endowed with at the beginning of the round
or the other type of good. Each trading round was restricted to a total of 5 minutes.
The forced-trade sessions diﬀered from the free-trade sessions only in one respect. Par-
ticipants were only allowed to keep the good in their possession at the end of the round if it
was not the type of good they were endowed with at the beginning of the round. If at the
end of the round they were still in possession of the type of good they were endowed with,
they had to return it to the experimenter. In this respect they were “forced” to trade, be-
cause they had to trade with a participant who was endowed with a diﬀerent good in order
to take home any good from that round. This procedure was aimed as a shock-therapy for
participants who are generally reluctant to trade. It demonstrates in a simple and tough
way that trading can sometimes be beneﬁcial.
In all sessions, we introduced an imbalance in the endowments over the three rounds.
In the ﬁrst round, exactly half of the participants received one of the goods and the other
half the second good, but in round 2 two more than half received one good and in round 3
four more than half. This increases the number of players who are unable to trade. The
purpose was to create pressure for the participants with the good in excess supply to trade
fast, in particular in the forced-trade sessions.
The eﬀect of the forced-trade treatment on the existence of an “endowment eﬀect”
was assessed in a simple manner that closely follows the procedures used by List (2003,
2004). This part was identical in both the forced-trade and the free-trade sessions. After
the last trading round, participants were given an additional good as compensation while
ﬁlling out a survey. They were informed that they could do whatever they wanted with
this good. They were then asked one by one to proceed to an adjacent room with their
endowed good. There a short exit interview was conducted (which did not reveal any
subject misconceptions regarding the experimental procedures). While still in isolation,
10Endowment D Endowment P Total
Free Trade free-D (18) free-P (20) 38
Forced Trade forced-D (16) forced-P (20) 36
Total 34 40
Table 1: Summary of experimental treatments. Endowment is the type of good given as com-
pensation for participation after the end of the ﬁrst stage. The number of participants in each
treatment is given in parentheses. Total numbers are given across categories.
they were oﬀered an exchange of the additional endowed good for another good. The rate
of exchange at this stage serves to measure the “endowment eﬀect”. In any one session
all participants were given the same good, but this diﬀered between sessions. Speciﬁcally,
in one of the free-trade and one of the forced-trade sessions, they were given a re-writable
DVD (D) and could exchange this for a package of copy paper (P). In the other two sessions,
it was the other way around. Pre-tests with other students revealed that both these goods
were of substantial value for the participants and were valued more than the goods from
the market trading rounds.
Hence we have a 2x2 design, with one dimension being the type of trade (free vs. forced)
in the ﬁrst part of the experiment and the other the type of good subjects were endowed
with in the second part of the experiment (D vs. P). Table 1 summarizes the treatments.
The number of participants in each treatment is given in parentheses.
If participants do not suﬀer from an “endowment eﬀect”, that is their preferences for
either D or P are independent of which of the goods they are endowed with, the share of
participants leaving with good D should be the same for both endowment conditions. This
implies that the average trade rate at the last stage would be 50%.7 An “endowment eﬀect”
7For example, if a share p of all participants prefer D over P, then in treatments free-D and forced-D, a
share 1−p should exchange D for P, while in treatments free-P and forced-P, a share p should exchange P
for D, yielding an average trade rate of
p+1−p
2 = 1
2. Note that if the treatments have diﬀerent numbers of
11implies a smaller average trade rate.
Our main hypotheses are, ﬁrst, that three rounds of free trade are not enough to elim-
inate the “endowment eﬀect” because participants will in general not trade in situations
where they are reluctant to trade and will hence not learn anything new, whereas, sec-
ond, forced trade is expected to signiﬁcantly reduce the “endowment eﬀect” because all
participants will experience beneﬁcial trade (or learn that missing out on a deal can be
harmful) and, in particular, some subjects will be “forced” to trade in situations where
they perceive high trade uncertainty and will thus learn something about these situations.
Put diﬀerently, forced trade, but not free trade, encourages subjects to learn new trading
strategies and this should carry over at least to some degree to the ﬁnal exchange stage
with the experimenter, since the trading mechanism is not fundamentally diﬀerent between
the training rounds and the exchange with the experimenter that we use to assess the “en-
dowment eﬀect”. Therefore if, as we hypothesize, trade uncertainty is largely responsible
for the “endowment eﬀect”, the latter should be substantially reduced after forced trade
compared to the treatment with free trade. If, however, choice uncertainty alone drives
the “endowment eﬀect” we should see little if any diﬀerence between the two treatments,
because the amount of experience with the various goods is the same in both treatments.
Furthermore, experience with three rounds is very limited and refers to diﬀerent types of
goods so that even if subjects make more trades in the forced-trade training rounds, the
scope for reducing choice uncertainty is very small.
It is also reasonable to expect that participants in the free-trade sessions who trade
more frequently would show a smaller “endowment eﬀect” than participants who trade less
participants, it is important to consider the average of the trade rates of both treatments and not the total
trade rate. Otherwise, the results could be biased. For example, if the number of participants is larger in
the treatment endowed with the generally more popular good, the total trade rate would be smaller than
1
2 even if in both treatments the same share of subjects chose this good.
12Rev. Prefer P Rev. Prefer D Total
free-P 15 (75%) 5 (25%) 20
free-D 7 (38.9%) 11 (61.1%) 18
Total 22 16
Table 2: Results for the test of the “endowment eﬀect” in the free-trade treatments. Participants
in treatment free-P are endowed with good P, those in free-D with good D. Rev. Prefer P and
Rev. Prefer D denote the numbers of those who revealed prefer P and D, respectively, i.e. they
leave with this good. In the absence of an “endowment eﬀect” the revealed preference would have
to be independent of the endowment.
frequently. This would, however, not allow us to infer that the former participants learn to
trade, as it could just be a selection eﬀect since those generally more willing to trade will
trade more, both in the three rounds of free trade and in the second stage of the experiment.
The comparison between free and forced trade does not suﬀer from any selection problems,
because participants were exogenously sorted into the diﬀerent treatments.
3 Experimental Results
We ﬁnd clear support for our main hypotheses. Table 2 shows the distribution of goods in
possession at the end, that is the revealed preferred good, for the free-trade treatments. We
see that in both free-P and free-D, the majority of participants leave with the goods they
were endowed with. The average trade rate is just 31.9%. Indeed, Fisher’s exact test rejects
the H0 that the revealed preference is independent of the endowment at conventional levels
of signiﬁcance (p = 0.047, two-sided).8 Thus we replicate the “endowment eﬀect” for the
8A caveat regarding our tests is that they treat the data as independent even though the participants
interacted before we employed our measure of the “endowment eﬀect”. It is, for example, conceivable that
a trade advocate in one of the treatments might have been very successful in the three rounds of trading
in convincing the others that trading is a good thing and that this might have carried over to the last
stage. We note, however, that there were no substantial diﬀerences in general trading activity (except for
13Rev. Prefer P Rev. Prefer D Total
forced-P 9 (45%) 11 (55%) 20
forced-D 6 (37.5%) 10 (62.5%) 16
Total 15 21
Table 3: Results for the test of the “endowment eﬀect” in the forced-trade treatments. Partici-
pants in treatment forced-P are endowed with good P, those in forced-D with good D. Rev. Prefer
P and Rev. Prefer D denote the numbers of those who revealed prefer P and D, respectively, i.e.
they leave with this good. In the absence of an “endowment eﬀect” the revealed preference would
have to be independent of the endowment.
free-trade treatments.
In the forced-trade treatments the results are remarkably diﬀerent. Table 3 shows the
revealed preferences for the forced-trade treatments. We see that the revealed preference is
essentially independent of the endowment. Indeed, Fisher’s exact test cannot reject the H0
that the revealed preference is independent of the endowment at any conventional level of
signiﬁcance (p = 0.741, two-sided)9 and the average trade rate is 46.3%, substantially closer
to the “rational” level of 50% than in the free-trade treatments. Thus the shock-therapy
applied in the forced-trade treatment is successful in almost completely eliminating the
“endowment eﬀect”.10
the expected eﬀect of more pressure in the forced-trade treatments). More importantly, the last stage was
conducted independently for each participant and involved trade with the experimenter with a one-shot
option in contrast to open haggling in a large group. Thus while one should keep this caveat in mind, we
strongly believe that it does not invalidate our main claim.
9A Pearson χ2- test is also far from any conventional level of signiﬁcance, χ2 = 0.206,p = 0.65)
10Alternatively, if we run a probit regression with the dependent variable whether the participant leaves
with good P, and independent variable a dummy whether she was endowed with good P, EndowP, we
ﬁnd that the endowment matters in the free-trade treatments (coeﬃcient for EndowP = 0.957, p = 0.025)
but not in the forced-trade treatments (coeﬃcient for EndowP = 0.1930, p = 0.65). Moreover, if we run
the regression for all data and include an interaction eﬀect EndowPXForced, we ﬁnd the latter to be
marginally signiﬁcant (coeﬃcient: −0.8001, p = 0.054). This supports the conclusion that the “endowment
14Rev. Prefer P Rev. Prefer D Total
non- free-P 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 4
traders free-D 2 (33.3%) 4 (66.7%) 6
infrequent free-P 9 (81.8%) 2 (18.2%) 11
traders free-D 4 (57.1%) 3 (42.9%) 7
frequent free-P 3 (60%) 2 (40%) 5
traders free-D 1 (20%) 4 (80%) 5
Table 4: Results for the test of the “endowment eﬀect” in the free-trade treatments, separately
for those who never trade (“non-traders”), those who trade exactly once (“infrequent traders”)
and those who trade at least twice (“frequent traders”) in the three rounds of free trade.
To address the additional question whether the “endowment eﬀect” is stronger for those
participants in the free-trade treatments who trade only little in the three rounds of market
trade, we split the sample into those who never trade (“non-traders”), those who trade only
once (“infrequent traders”) and those who trade two or three times (“frequent traders”).
The results are given in Table 4. We observe relatively few non-traders or frequent traders
(10 for each category) and in both cases three subjects trade and seven do not. The category
of infrequent traders is most frequent (18 subjects) and the average trade rate (37.6%) is
just slightly larger than that for the other categories. In none of the categories by itself is
there a signiﬁcant “endowment eﬀect” (p > 0.3 in all cases according to Fisher’s exact test,
two-sided).11 Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence that the amount of trading experience gathered in
the free-trade sessions has an eﬀect on the likelihood of trading in the second stage.
One might wonder why those subjects who trade two or three times in the market
stage still look like showing an “endowment eﬀect” afterwards. There are a number of
eﬀect” is indeed (signiﬁcantly) weaker with forced trade.
11If we aggregate either the non-traders and the infrequent traders, or the infrequent and frequent
traders, we do not get a signiﬁcant “endowment eﬀect” (p = 0.114 and p = 0.121, respectively, Fisher’s
exact test, two-sided). According to Pearson χ2- tests, the eﬀect is marginally signiﬁcant in both cases,
χ2 = 3.475,p = 0.062 and χ2 = 3.193,p = 0.074), respectively.
15possible explanations. First, given that these are only 10 observations, we cannot really
conclude anything from the fact that only three among them trade. Second, we do not claim
that individual subjects perceive the same degree of trade uncertainty in all possible trades.
The degree of uncertainty they perceive may depend on various factors and these particular
subjects may have perceived low or no uncertainty in the market stage and high uncertainty
in the exchange with the experimenter. Trading in the face of low uncertainty should not
provide insights into trades with high perceived uncertainty. Third, these subjects may
have perceived a non-trivial degree of trade uncertainty, but at the same time they may
have had suﬃciently strong preferences regarding the goods in the market stage that they
overcame that uncertainty. A possible reason why they might not learn anything from
these trades could be that if they have a strong preference for the object they can obtain
through trade, they do not pay much attention to the perceived risk and hence do not learn
anything about it. In contrast, if the preference is weak, uncertainty comes into focus and
something can be learned about it (but only if is is overcome, which is not the case in the
free-trade treatment if their preference between goods is weak).
4 Discussion
We argue that existing results on the robustness of the “endowment eﬀect” can be better
understood thanks to the distinction between choice and trade uncertainty. We thus review
existing interpretations of the “endowment eﬀect” through the lenses of our two dimensional
approach.
Taken together the results in List (2003) and List (2004) already suggest that no simple
and uniﬁed explanation can account for all his results simultaneously. In the ﬁrst experi-
ment, the goods belong to the same category that are usually exchanged by his subjects.
16However, subjects are not familiar with the objects used in the experiment, as the speciﬁc
items are unique pieces. The uncertainty with respect to the relative value of these objects
is relatively high, but can well be substantially lower for subjects with a lot of experience
with related goods. This supports the view that these results may be driven by what we
called choice uncertainty.
This explanation is no longer valid to explain the fact that market experience also has
an impact when the goods at stake are familiar objects (such as mugs and chocolate bars
in List, 2004). Such familiar objects should cause little choice uncertainty and moreover,
it is unclear why this should be lower for those subjects with substantial experience in
sports-card markets. Thus two issues need explanation, as choice uncertainty seems unable
to capture them. First, why is there an “endowment eﬀect” for such familiar objects, and
second, how can we explain the apparent spill-over of experience to completely diﬀerent
goods? Trade uncertainty is a very plausible candidate to explain both the “endowment ef-
fect” for familiar goods as well as the rationality spill-overs: the trading mechanism remains
constant, while the nature of the goods at stake changed. According to this view experi-
enced traders are those who realized that trading close to their indiﬀerence curve is safe
(whether the underlying reason is selection or learning through occasional experimentation
is another matter), not necessarily those who are experts in the type of goods exchanged
in a sports-card market.
Our two dimensional view and the result that trade uncertainty is an important aspect
is very much in line with the existing results obtained in the lab.12 Plott and Zeiler (2007)
12Several papers, including Plott and Zeiler (2007), suggest a distinction similar to what we interpret as
trade and choice uncertainty. See also Section 5 in Braga and Starmer (2005), who distinguish between
“institutional learning” and “value learning”. This distinction to some degree parallels ours between trade
uncertainty and choice uncertainty, but Braga and Starmer’s institutional learning is more concerned with
subjects’ understanding of the mechanism (similar to Plott and Zeiler, 2005), whereas trade uncertainty
captures the risk related to the mechanism.
17demonstrate that the “endowment eﬀect” is very sensitive to various experimental features
such as (1) method and language used to endow subjects, (2) suggestions of relative val-
ues, (3) location of the endowed good at the time of choice and (4) public revelation of
choices. The variables that Plott and Zeiler identify as crucial are those closely related to
trade uncertainty (such as the method of endowing subjects with a good), whereas those
addressing only aspects of choice uncertainty (such as public revelation of choice) are not
suﬃcient to eliminate the “endowment eﬀect”. However, it is not always straightforward to
assign each of their experimental features to one of our two categories. For example, they
identify as a crucial aspect whether the experimenter chooses the object that subjects are
endowed with. This entails both aspects: fear of oﬀending the experimenter by rejecting
a gift (which is an element of trade uncertainty as it refers to the process) and signaling
the experimenter’s preference for one object, thus sending a signal about the relative value
of the object (which impacts on choice uncertainty). The important point is that the two
dimensions – trade and choice uncertainty – are both aﬀected and that taken together
they account for all the experimental features used in Plott and Zeiler’s experiment (while
existing theory, operating along one dimension only, cannot explain their results).
The related phenomenon of the WTP-WTA gap is addressed by Plott and Zeiler (2005).
When subjects are asked to report their maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for an object,
this is frequently much lower than their reported willingness to accept (WTA) for part-
ing with the identical object if it is in their possession. Besides the fact that objects are
exchanged for money, rather than for another object, the main diﬀerence is that an incen-
tive compatible mechanism is required to elicit individual values. The mechanism typically
used is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). Essentially,
such an experiment thus consists of an exchange made through a sophisticated trade mech-
anism. Hence, it is likely that subjects perceive substantial trade uncertainty. Importantly,
18Plott and Zeiler show that the WTP-WTA gap disappears with suﬃcient training, and
conclude that subjects’ misconceptions are central for the eﬀect. This corresponds to trade
uncertainty being diminished by better explanation of the trade mechanism.
The particular case where the goods at stake are lotteries deserves a comment. In the
set of experiments we have described so far, market experience – as well as a proper control
for subjects’ misconceptions – is supposed to eliminate, or at least reduce, any kind of
uncertainty. Thus, the way individuals behave in uncertain situation loses relevance with
experience. This is no longer the case if the goods to be sold or bought are lotteries.13 There
is a substantial inherent uncertainty that cannot be resolved with market experience. In
such situations, some anomalies might survive with market experience and some others can
even be created, as the results in Braga et al. (2006) suggest.
The distinction between choice uncertainty and trade uncertainty parallels the diﬀerent
interpretations of their experimental results by List on the one hand and by Plott and Zeiler
on the other. An “endowment eﬀect” driven by choice uncertainty would suggest that the
eﬀect is “real” (in the sense of being a systematic deviation from rational choice models),
but can diminish as traders gain experience and become more sure of their preferences, as
List suggests. Choice uncertainty can be accounted for by classical economic theory with
incomplete information about the objects available for trade. This can cause biases such
as the “endowment eﬀect” if subjects obtain biased signals, for example through speciﬁc
decisions of the experimenter, as Plott and Zeiler (2007) argue. The reduction of choice
uncertainty as observed in List’s experiments can be captured by learning models in a
sort of “learning by trading” model. Choice uncertainty should then diminish only with
substantial experience and the resolution of choice uncertainty through learning should be
good-speciﬁc.
13In particular, see Braga et al. (2006), Loomes et al. (2007) and Isoni et al. (2008)
19Trade uncertainty, however, is rather along the lines of subject misconceptions and
artifacts of the experimental procedures (though the misconceptions in this case are not
about the procedures but about the risks related to them), which Plott and Zeiler showed
to be a major factor underlying the “endowment eﬀect”. Accounting for the strategic
mistakes of subjects who are prone to those misconceptions in a theoretical model is a very
challenging task. Nevertheless, we can make some general inferences how overcoming biased
behavior in the face of trade uncertainty can look like. As subjects can understand through
experimentation that diﬀerent strategies can be more successful, learning to overcome these
mistakes and misconceptions related to trade uncertainty can be sudden and – depending
on the complexity of the trade mechanism – fast and does not have to be good-speciﬁc.
Indeed in our experiment, forced trade appears to let subjects learn in an indirect way
about the strategic errors, as they are strongly encouraged to experiment with diﬀerent
trading strategies and the “endowment eﬀect” thus disappears with little experience.
An important issue is the question of what our results mean for a possible “endowment
eﬀect” outside the lab. We note, ﬁrst, that in spite of the relation of trade uncertainty and
subject misconceptions, an “endowment eﬀect” caused by trade uncertainty can neverthe-
less be “real”, because trade uncertainty may naturally be present on markets. In contrast,
if an “endowment eﬀect” observed in experiments is just an artifact of experimental design
as suggested by Plott and Zeiler (2007), there is in general no reason to believe that it oc-
curs outside biased experimental settings. Second, one might argue that our “forced-trade”
treatment just shifts the expectation of subjects about what the experimenter wants them
to do from not trading to trading, thus undermining a naturally occurring “endowment
eﬀect”. While subjects’ expectations might be aﬀected, this only supports the more fun-
damental point of our distinction into choice uncertainty and trade uncertainty, namely,
that concerns that are unrelated to the choice between the two objects are relevant to the
20decision whether to trade. Wanting to satisfy the expectation of the experimenter has
nothing to do with subjects’ uncertainty regarding their preferences or the fact that they
are endowed with one good, but with issues regarding the social interaction of the trading
process itself. And arguably, typical designs will tend towards suggesting that the experi-
menter holds expectations of the subjects not trading. Hence our experiment as such does
not disprove the existence of an “endowment eﬀect” outside experimental settings, but sug-
gests that previous explanations are insuﬃcient. This may or may not aﬀect expectations
regarding its relevance in the ﬁeld.
5 Conclusions
We have argued that recent experiments on the robustness of the “endowment eﬀect” can
be better understood by distinguishing between two diﬀerent types of uncertainty involved
in trading. Speciﬁcally we argue that these results point to a major role for what we call
trade uncertainty, but that what we call choice uncertainty cannot provide a consistent
explanation of these results.
Our own experiment provides a further test of the roles of these two types of uncertainty.
We have shown that a simple design feature, “forced trade”, eliminates the “endowment
eﬀect” in an environment where the same amount of experience with simple “free trade”
yields a signiﬁcant and substantial exchange asymmetry. This complements and extends
recent results by List (2003, 2004) who shows that substantial trade experience can eliminate
the “endowment eﬀect”. Speciﬁcally, we show that much more limited experience than
that recorded by List can be eﬀective in eliminating the “endowment eﬀect”. Moreover,
our results support our hypothesis that trade uncertainty rather than choice uncertainty
is fundamental to the “endowment eﬀect” because opportunities for learning with respect
21to choice uncertainty are comparable between the two treatments, whereas forced trade,
but not free trade, provides incentives for learning new trading strategies and hence for
reducing trade uncertainty. These results support the view that it is possible to overcome
the “endowment eﬀect” with relatively little experience but that a free market is a poor
teacher for this.
Interpreting our experiment from the perspective of Plott’s (1996) discovered preference
hypothesis, what traders appear to discover are not their preferences regarding the goods
they can trade, but rather their preferences regarding trade itself. For example, they might
need to learn their risk aversion with respect to the trading process. And if traders can
freely choose whether to trade or not, they will generally shy away from the trades that
would help them discover their preferences.
Obviously, the present experiment and discussion do not provide the ultimate answer
to the question of what drives the “endowment eﬀect”, but through new insights into what
can be learned by market experience they provide a promising starting point and useful
terminology for further research into possible underlying causes.
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